I am a tenure-track Assistant Professor at Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU), a CEPR Research Affiliate, and a visiting scholar at the University of Oxford.

Primary research fields: Behavioral macroeconomics and labor economics.

Some topics that I am particularly interested in are inflation expectations and real decisions, monetary policy communication, and information choice. My research combines empirical evidence with theory, employing a broad array of methods, including macroeconomic lab and survey experiments as well as machine learning techniques, such as textual analysis.

I received my PhD in Economics from the University of Oxford in 2025.

You can find my full CV here.

Contact: alena.wabitsch@wu.ac.at

Twitter: @lw_alena

Bsky: @a-wabitsch.bsky.social

Google Scholar: Profile, Citations: >280

Research

Publications:

Central Bank Communication with Non-Experts - A Road to Nowhere? (Journal of Monetary Economics 2022, together with Michael Ehrmann)

Working Paper, VoxEU, SUERF Policy Brief
Covered by Bloomberg and The Economist, and in a speech by Christine Lagarde

Abstract: Central banks have intensified their communication with non-experts – an endeavour which some argue will fail. This paper studies English and German tweets about the ECB to show that its communication is received by non-experts, i.e. is not a road to nowhere. Following ECB communications, tweets often primarily relay information, become more factual and the views expressed more moderate and homogeneous. Some communications, such as Mario Draghi's “Whatever it takes”, trigger a divergence in views. Also, tweets with negative, stronger or more subjective views are more likely retweeted, liked or replied to. Thus, Twitter also constitutes a platform for controversial discussions.

New Technologies and Jobs in Europe (Economic Policy 2025, together with Stefania Albanesi, António Dias da Silva, Juan F. Jimeno & Ana Lamo)

Working Paper, VoxEU, ECB Research Bulletin
Covered by WIRED, The Wall Street Journal, Reuters, etc.

Abstract: We examine the link between labour market developments and new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and software in 16 European countries over the period 2011- 2019. Using data for occupations at the 3-digit level in Europe, we find that on average employment shares have increased in occupations more exposed to AI. This is particularly the case for occupations with a relatively higher proportion of younger and skilled workers. This evidence is in line with the Skill Biased Technological Change theory. While there exists heterogeneity across countries, only very few countries show a decline in employment shares of occupations more exposed to AI-enabled automation. Country heterogeneity for this result seems to be linked to the pace of technology diffusion and education, but also to the level of product market regulation (competition) and employment protection laws. In contrast to the findings for employment, we find little evidence for a relationship between wages and potential exposures to new technologies.

AI and Women's Employment in Europe (American Economic Association: Papers and Proceedings 2025, together with Stefania Albanesi, António Dias da Silva, Juan F. Jimeno & Ana Lamo)

Working Paper, VoxEU

Abstract: We examine the link between the diffusion of artificial intelligence (AI) enabled technologies and changes in the female employment share in 16 European countries over the period 2011-2019. Using data for occupations at the 3-digit level, we find that on average female employment shares increased in occupations more exposed to AI. Countries with high initial female labor force participation and higher initial female relative education show a stronger positive association. While there exists heterogeneity across countries, almost all show a positive relation between changes in female employment shares within occupations and exposure to AI-enabled automation.

Working Papers:

The Messenger Matters (Working Paper)

Winner of the European Central Bank’s Young Economist Prize 2025
Winner of Peter Sinclair Prize 2024 by The Money Macro and Finance Society
Covered by the Financial Times
Funded by the 2022 Dissertation Fellowship by the Austrian Economic Association, University of Oxford and St. Catherine's College

Abstract: Does the messenger matter in public communication? To be impactful, policy communication - on monetary, climate, fiscal, or other issues - must reach people and influence their beliefs. This paper combines big data, causal experimental evidence, and theory to study the role of messenger identity. When audiences share identity traits with messengers, policymakers become more salient, messages more available, and signals more influential. A generalized coordination model demonstrates that diverse messengers maximize welfare when public information is precise, while centralized communication does so when it is imprecise, identifying strategic messenger selection as an additional policy tool distinct from traditional disclosure policies.

Presented at:
2025: ECB Forum on Central Banking (Sintra), Celeveland Fed, WU Vienna, University of Amsterdam, University of Mannheim, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, University of Manchester, Nova SBE, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), Leibniz Institute for Financial Research (SAFE), ECB (Topical Talk)
2024: CEBRA Annual Meeting, EEA-ESEM, EABCN: New Challenges in Monetary Economics at the University of Mannheim, Esade Workshop in Behavioral and Experimental Economics, European Association of Young Economists (EAYE) Conference (Paris School of Economics), Annual MMF PhD Conference (University of Surrey), CEPR Central Bank Communication RPN Seminar Series, London School of Economics (Behavioural Finance Group), Oxford-CEPR Central Bank Communication Workshop, University of Oxford (Macroeconomics Workshop)
2023: Austrian Economic Association (NOeG) Winter and Annual Workshops, University of Oxford (Behavioural Lab), Sverige's Riksbank, Expectations in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models (TU Vienna)

Banks, Bonds and Tax Avoidance (Revised Working Paper coming soon; together with Tobias Cagala)

Revise & Resubmit, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

Abstract: We examine how multinational banks shift profits through intra-group financing. Using security-level data, we find that banks fund lower-tax affiliates at below-market rates through bonds: a 1-percentage-point tax differential decreases intra-group bond returns by 5.1% and increases intra-group holdings by 11.7%. By demonstrating how banks exploit bond-specific features – such as issue price discounts, coupon structuring, and tradability – to optimize tax positions, we reveal the sophisticated role of financial instruments in tax avoidance. Our finding that European tax havens play a central role underscores weaknesses in controlled foreign corporation rules and has implications for regulation.

Incentivizing Inflation Expectations (Working Paper; together with Sergii Drobot, Daniela Puzzello and Ryan Rholes)

Abstract: Accurate inflation expectations are central to economic modeling and policy. Yet major surveys elicit them without performance-based marginal incentives, despite their well-established importance to belief data quality in experimental economics. We show that marginal incentives raise effort and fundamentally reshape reported inflation expectations: lowering upward bias by 3.4 percentage points, reducing disagreement by one-third, closing the gender gap, and tripling learning rates in an RCT. Incentivized expectations are more consistent and better predict spending. Calibrating a simple New Keynesian model, we demonstrate that these differences matter: marginal incentives sharpen empirical inference and improve policy guidance - without increasing participant remuneration.

Work-In-Progress:

When Talk Isn't Cheap: Inflation Expectations Across the Political Cycle (Working Paper available upon request; together with Ryan Rholes)

Abstract: Survey evidence reveals large partisan gaps in inflation expectations and economic attitudes, but whether these reflect genuine beliefs or partisan signaling remains unclear. We test this using a two-wave experiment around the 2024 U.S. presidential election that randomly assigns performance-based incentives for inflation forecasts. Without incentives, partisan gaps are large and persistent; with incentives, they shrink by about 70\%, expectations become more anchored, and partisan bias in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution disappears. Incentives also reduce partisan differences in updating beliefs after Fed communications. Together, our results indicate that most partisan differences in reported inflation expectations reflect cheap talk rather than true belief differences.

Inattention to Financial Information: The Role of Income (together with Tanja Linta and Manuel Mosquera-Tarrio)

Secured competitive, merit-based funding: British Academy/Leverhulme Grant 2022
Winner of the Joachim Herz Award 2022

Abstract: This paper studies how individuals make lifecycle consumption and savings choices when facing stochastic returns on their investments, and how they value information about these returns, conditional on their income. To address this question, we run a large-scale online experiment based on a permanent income model with stochastic interest rates. Two factors are randomized: prior availability of interest-rate information (exposure) and income (stakes). We measure information demand by willingness to pay, and find that exposure to information increases demand only among high-income participants; when stakes are low, exposure has little effect. This means individuals can learn to value information, but only when the stakes are sufficiently high. Heterogeneity in attention thus reflects not only processing costs but also variation in perceived benefits that scale with economic stakes. These findings underscore the limits of financial literacy initiatives.

Linking Expectations and Decisions (together with Michael McMahon and Ryan Rholes)

Secured competitive, merit-based funding: British Academy/Leverhulme Grant 2023

Abstract: The concept of the Euler equation is fundamental to understanding and modeling intertemporal choice, investment, and consumption-savings decisions, but also asset pricing, policy analysis, and DSGE models. A rapidly growing empirical literature is contradictory about the relationship between inflation expectations and consumption. This poses critical questions: Do consumption decisions react causally to inflation expectations? And if they do, what are the mechanisms, conditions, and reasons behind this response? This paper aims to answer these questions through controlled, large-scale experiments. We will focus on how consumption responds to changes in expected inflation, changes in inflation uncertainty, and changes in both simultaneously that either reinforce or offset each other. Further, we show how these relationships are impacted by the durability of the consumption good, whether agents must borrow or save to consume, and whether changes in expected inflation lead to changes in the real interest rate or the nominal interest rate.

A Penny For Your Thoughts? Incentive Design and Inflation Expectations Elicitation (together with Sergii Drobot, Daniela Puzzello, Ryan Rholes and Daniela Valdivia)

Cognitive Imprecision and Risk Taking (together with Yifan Zhang)

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